I came across some interesting research entitled “Will the Voluntary Checkoff Program be the Answer? An Analysis of Optimal Advertising and Free-Rider Problem in the U.S. Beef Industry” that should be of interest to all Alberta beef producers. In 2004 research was conducted in the United States on the market place impacts that would be expected if the compulsory check off that was in place in the U.S. were to be made voluntary, exactly as later happened in Alberta.
The term free rider is commonly used to refer to those producers who ask for a refund of their check off. In effect they are getting a free ride while continuing to benefit from the industry work funded by the participating producers.
The key phrase is “The possible voluntary program is expected to further under-invest in advertising and promotion programs, and as a result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits. The free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 percent.” See Table 5.
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Discussions and Conclusions
This study develops a framework for the analysis of optimal advertising and free-rider problem. Previous studies in the literature were extended in two ways. First, the new framework allows retailer’s oligopsony power separately from processor’s market power. Second, to examine the free-rider problem, we introduce the trade component to the model and divide domestic producers into two groups: participating producers and non-participating producers in the possible voluntary program. Then, the free-rider problem was measured as the amount of domestic price decrease due to the increased production from importers and non-participating producers.
The optimal advertising rule derived in this study indicates that as retailer’s oligopoly power increases the optimal advertising level decreases. The oligopsony power is not relevant to the determination of optimal advertising intensity, which is consistent with Zhang and Sexton. The optimal advertising rule also suggests that as import supply elasticity becomes more elastic, the optimal intensity decreases. The newly derived rule is consistent with Dorfman and Steiner in which as demand elasticity is more elastic, the optimal advertising intensity decreases, while the intensity increases as the advertising effectiveness increases.
Simulation results for the U.S. beef industry indicate that the industry has under-invested in advertising and promotion programs except a few cases where advertising effectiveness is extremely low (0.0005), the degree of imperfect competition is exceptionally high (0.3), and import supply elasticity is highly elastic (higher than 5). The possible voluntary program is expected to further under-invest in advertising and promotion programs, and as a result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits. The free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 percent.
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/34694/1/sp04ch05.pdf
The term free rider is commonly used to refer to those producers who ask for a refund of their check off. In effect they are getting a free ride while continuing to benefit from the industry work funded by the participating producers.
The key phrase is “The possible voluntary program is expected to further under-invest in advertising and promotion programs, and as a result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits. The free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 percent.” See Table 5.
<Begin Paste>
Discussions and Conclusions
This study develops a framework for the analysis of optimal advertising and free-rider problem. Previous studies in the literature were extended in two ways. First, the new framework allows retailer’s oligopsony power separately from processor’s market power. Second, to examine the free-rider problem, we introduce the trade component to the model and divide domestic producers into two groups: participating producers and non-participating producers in the possible voluntary program. Then, the free-rider problem was measured as the amount of domestic price decrease due to the increased production from importers and non-participating producers.
The optimal advertising rule derived in this study indicates that as retailer’s oligopoly power increases the optimal advertising level decreases. The oligopsony power is not relevant to the determination of optimal advertising intensity, which is consistent with Zhang and Sexton. The optimal advertising rule also suggests that as import supply elasticity becomes more elastic, the optimal intensity decreases. The newly derived rule is consistent with Dorfman and Steiner in which as demand elasticity is more elastic, the optimal advertising intensity decreases, while the intensity increases as the advertising effectiveness increases.
Simulation results for the U.S. beef industry indicate that the industry has under-invested in advertising and promotion programs except a few cases where advertising effectiveness is extremely low (0.0005), the degree of imperfect competition is exceptionally high (0.3), and import supply elasticity is highly elastic (higher than 5). The possible voluntary program is expected to further under-invest in advertising and promotion programs, and as a result, producers are likely to lose 25 to 85 percent of current promotion benefits. The free-riding from non-participating producers would lower market price by 5 to 20 percent.
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/34694/1/sp04ch05.pdf
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