The following is a post from the Food Safety Network. Although it is lengthy, I found it a very good read.
The meat of the matter; Blame Canada?
December 30, 2003
Globe and Mail
A19
Justin Kastner and Douglas Powell
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20031230/COB30/Comment/Idx
Food-safety officials in the United States have long been on the lookout for mad-cow disease. Now that they have finally found it, they should note how Canada managed a similar scenario just a few months ago.
A whisper of the words bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad-cow disease) conjures up images of the United Kingdom's despairing bout with the disease during the 1990s. But while officials with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration must be mindful of BSE's devastating potential (which the U.K. story tells), they should focus on the recent Canadian experience with BSE. This revealed the value of publicly and transparently showcasing a vigilant, proactive regulatory system, while acknowledging the likelihood that the disease is most likely not limited to just one animal. In Canada, this strategy has paid real dividends, engendering enough consumer confidence to yield an actual increase in domestic beef consumption. No other country with a BSE discovery has accomplished that.
Last week's announcement of the presumptive discovery of a case of BSE in the U.S. will test whether the two North American giants can learn from each other -- especially if tests confirm that the infected animal originated in Canada.
Since the 1800s, agricultural trade and scientific co-operation have been hallmarks of Canadian-American relations. Nineteenth-century tariff wars, ongoing squabbles over agricultural subsidies and last May's discovery of mad-cow disease in Western Canada have all tested economic interdependence and scientific harmonization at the 49th parallel. Yet, the two countries have persisted as each other's most important trading partner and, historically, have adopted scientifically similar approaches to ensure the safety of the food supply.
Today, the economic partnership and scientific like-mindedness of Canada and the United States are conspicuous throughout the world. Hopefully, the two countries will continue to mimic each other's evidence-based approaches to food-safety regulation.
For the U.S. now, finger-pointing is of little use: While a blame Canada approach may help reopen U.S. beef exports and sell newspapers, it is probable that BSE will eventually be discovered in an American-born animal. So, just as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) did six months ago, the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service should now focus on the real question at hand: Can the disease be controlled and contained?
Based on current information, the answer is yes, which should lend some comfort to consumers and the international community.
Both Canadian and U.S. discoveries of mad-cow disease resulted from proactive, vigilant surveillance systems. In the Washington state case, a veterinary inspector followed routine procedures by singling out a sick animal and requesting that it be tested for BSE. High-risk materials (including the brain and spinal cord) were removed from the animal, and a series of tests were initiated.
Other questions remain. Like Canada, the U.S. must now investigate how the animal might have contracted the disease. The BSE find, while reassuringly made before high-risk materials from the infected cow made it into the food chain, begs several questions.
BSE is a slow-progressing, fatal nervous disorder of adult cattle that causes a characteristic staggering gait and is similar to a handful of rare neurological diseases that affect humans and other animals. While North American regulators have detected and summarily dealt with BSE before (in 1993 and May, 2003, in Canada), both Canada and the U.S. have not yet experienced widespread BSE outbreaks like those seen in the U.K. This is a tribute to skilled veterinarians and regulatory programs that, situated in the context of elusive science, are cautious.
In the U.K., BSE took root via production practices that involved feeding cattle protein from cattle infected with BSE. For years, regulators understood this connection (in veterinarian lingo, the "ruminant-to-ruminant" feeding link), prompting Britain to ban such feed in 1989. But it failed to enforce the rules on the books, at least until 1996, when public-health research demonstrated that the consumption of BSE-infected beef was strongly linked to a new variant of the human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
In 1997, recognizing that the input of BSE-infected feed into cattle production might spawn an outbreak of BSE, and following the suggestion of a link between BSE and CJD, the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feed was banned in North America. Checks by both Canadian and U.S. food-inspection officials ensure that compliance by feed mills is high.
But banning ruminant-to-ruminant feeding practices may not, in fact, be a sure firewall to prevent the spread of BSE. That is why, since 1990, both the U.S. and Canada have banned cattle imports from several European countries, and during the past few years, have extended the ban to other countries.
The USDA must now explore, as Canada's Food Inspection Agency did last spring, the following questions: Where did the infected animal originate? Were there, perhaps, lapses in feed manufacturing procedures? Will other animals test positive? Indeed, the great unknown is how many cattle are quietly harbouring the disease and potentially passing it on to meat eaters. How are sickly animals being dealt with? Unlike the Alberta BSE case, which was completely removed from the human food chain, muscle meat from the Washington state cow was allowed forward for further processing. Should this practice be allowed, even though muscle meat has been shown to be of negligible BSE risk?
Publicly asking and answering these questions is where the Canadian experience comes in. Dealing with these legitimate questions in a transparent manner is an important extension of a vigilant regulatory system. As the CFIA opened its books to domestic and international watchdog groups, it undertook to answer them. In doing so, it gained public confidence and despite international bans on Canadian beef, domestic demand went up.
Like microbial food-borne illness, as surveillance activities increase, more cases will be found, creating a paradox of headlines against a food-safety infrastructure that has never been stronger. Transparency and demonstrable efforts that actions match words are the best way to enhance consumer confidence.
Justin Kastner is an assistant professor in agricultural security at Kansas State University. Douglas Powell is an associate professor and scientific director of the Food Safety Network at the University of Guelph, and co-author of Mad Cows and Mother's Milk.
The meat of the matter; Blame Canada?
December 30, 2003
Globe and Mail
A19
Justin Kastner and Douglas Powell
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20031230/COB30/Comment/Idx
Food-safety officials in the United States have long been on the lookout for mad-cow disease. Now that they have finally found it, they should note how Canada managed a similar scenario just a few months ago.
A whisper of the words bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad-cow disease) conjures up images of the United Kingdom's despairing bout with the disease during the 1990s. But while officials with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration must be mindful of BSE's devastating potential (which the U.K. story tells), they should focus on the recent Canadian experience with BSE. This revealed the value of publicly and transparently showcasing a vigilant, proactive regulatory system, while acknowledging the likelihood that the disease is most likely not limited to just one animal. In Canada, this strategy has paid real dividends, engendering enough consumer confidence to yield an actual increase in domestic beef consumption. No other country with a BSE discovery has accomplished that.
Last week's announcement of the presumptive discovery of a case of BSE in the U.S. will test whether the two North American giants can learn from each other -- especially if tests confirm that the infected animal originated in Canada.
Since the 1800s, agricultural trade and scientific co-operation have been hallmarks of Canadian-American relations. Nineteenth-century tariff wars, ongoing squabbles over agricultural subsidies and last May's discovery of mad-cow disease in Western Canada have all tested economic interdependence and scientific harmonization at the 49th parallel. Yet, the two countries have persisted as each other's most important trading partner and, historically, have adopted scientifically similar approaches to ensure the safety of the food supply.
Today, the economic partnership and scientific like-mindedness of Canada and the United States are conspicuous throughout the world. Hopefully, the two countries will continue to mimic each other's evidence-based approaches to food-safety regulation.
For the U.S. now, finger-pointing is of little use: While a blame Canada approach may help reopen U.S. beef exports and sell newspapers, it is probable that BSE will eventually be discovered in an American-born animal. So, just as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) did six months ago, the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service should now focus on the real question at hand: Can the disease be controlled and contained?
Based on current information, the answer is yes, which should lend some comfort to consumers and the international community.
Both Canadian and U.S. discoveries of mad-cow disease resulted from proactive, vigilant surveillance systems. In the Washington state case, a veterinary inspector followed routine procedures by singling out a sick animal and requesting that it be tested for BSE. High-risk materials (including the brain and spinal cord) were removed from the animal, and a series of tests were initiated.
Other questions remain. Like Canada, the U.S. must now investigate how the animal might have contracted the disease. The BSE find, while reassuringly made before high-risk materials from the infected cow made it into the food chain, begs several questions.
BSE is a slow-progressing, fatal nervous disorder of adult cattle that causes a characteristic staggering gait and is similar to a handful of rare neurological diseases that affect humans and other animals. While North American regulators have detected and summarily dealt with BSE before (in 1993 and May, 2003, in Canada), both Canada and the U.S. have not yet experienced widespread BSE outbreaks like those seen in the U.K. This is a tribute to skilled veterinarians and regulatory programs that, situated in the context of elusive science, are cautious.
In the U.K., BSE took root via production practices that involved feeding cattle protein from cattle infected with BSE. For years, regulators understood this connection (in veterinarian lingo, the "ruminant-to-ruminant" feeding link), prompting Britain to ban such feed in 1989. But it failed to enforce the rules on the books, at least until 1996, when public-health research demonstrated that the consumption of BSE-infected beef was strongly linked to a new variant of the human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
In 1997, recognizing that the input of BSE-infected feed into cattle production might spawn an outbreak of BSE, and following the suggestion of a link between BSE and CJD, the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feed was banned in North America. Checks by both Canadian and U.S. food-inspection officials ensure that compliance by feed mills is high.
But banning ruminant-to-ruminant feeding practices may not, in fact, be a sure firewall to prevent the spread of BSE. That is why, since 1990, both the U.S. and Canada have banned cattle imports from several European countries, and during the past few years, have extended the ban to other countries.
The USDA must now explore, as Canada's Food Inspection Agency did last spring, the following questions: Where did the infected animal originate? Were there, perhaps, lapses in feed manufacturing procedures? Will other animals test positive? Indeed, the great unknown is how many cattle are quietly harbouring the disease and potentially passing it on to meat eaters. How are sickly animals being dealt with? Unlike the Alberta BSE case, which was completely removed from the human food chain, muscle meat from the Washington state cow was allowed forward for further processing. Should this practice be allowed, even though muscle meat has been shown to be of negligible BSE risk?
Publicly asking and answering these questions is where the Canadian experience comes in. Dealing with these legitimate questions in a transparent manner is an important extension of a vigilant regulatory system. As the CFIA opened its books to domestic and international watchdog groups, it undertook to answer them. In doing so, it gained public confidence and despite international bans on Canadian beef, domestic demand went up.
Like microbial food-borne illness, as surveillance activities increase, more cases will be found, creating a paradox of headlines against a food-safety infrastructure that has never been stronger. Transparency and demonstrable efforts that actions match words are the best way to enhance consumer confidence.
Justin Kastner is an assistant professor in agricultural security at Kansas State University. Douglas Powell is an associate professor and scientific director of the Food Safety Network at the University of Guelph, and co-author of Mad Cows and Mother's Milk.
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