Citing bull
Will Verboven - Monday,22 May 2006
Western Standard
In March, the Fraser Institute released a report entitled Mad Cow: A Case Study in Canadian-American Relations. While the Vancouver-based think-tank is renowned for its careful research and reports on topics affecting the Canadian economy and society in general, this report raises some concerns from the very start.
First of all, while it may seem trivial, the author, Alexander Moens, uses the term "mad cow" in the title and throughout the report. Although the correct name, BSE, is also used, it's disconcerting that a professionally commissioned document would even use a colloquialism employed by the media strictly for fear-mongering purposes. Within the agricultural industry and government agencies, "mad cow" is almost never used.
The report in general is a good compilation of the events surrounding the BSE crisis, its impact on the cattle economy and the roles of the various stakeholders. But having said that, one is confronted with an astonishing conclusion and some glaring omissions in the research. One might attribute some of this to the lofty perch of the author at Simon Fraser University in B.C.--far from the centre of the issue in Alberta.
The most startling statement in the report is in the executive summary, which states, "The United States government did not engage in protectionist or arbitrary actions." That statement alone would have amazed many in the industry who served on the front lines fighting the issue at the political and governmental level--most of whom receive scant if any mention in this report.
What the author does not make clear is what constitutes his definition of protectionism. One could assume from the author's perspective that the softwood lumber issue or any trade issue for that matter is not protectionist as long as U.S. government agencies operate in an administrative and legal manner. That's a rather naive assumption that senior civil servants are ignorant of the political winds swirling around them on a sensitive trade issue. Granted, court challenges have caused delays, but import issues are always good for political fodder at election time, a factor that senior U.S. bureaucrats are keenly aware of, particularly if they cherish their jobs.
The simple fact is that Washington's reaction in closing the border and stalling the reopening process (limitations persist even to this day) was not based on science and therefore clearly had protectionist motives. The report tries to give credence to the science-based actions of the U.S., but how does one reconcile that with the fact that the Canadian government has not once restricted the consumption of domestic beef, based on their own version of the science. The report gives the appearance that the Americans' perception of the science trumps the Canadian version and so the border closure was justified. That's strictly political science.
Curiously, Moens does an in-depth review of the political and protectionist forces within the U.S. that pressured government agencies to keep the border closed. He notes that those pressures were instrumental in delaying the reopening of the border to cattle and beef products. It would seem that is the point of protectionism, with time and delay being part of the process. Hence, we still have trade problems with softwood lumber and live cattle.
Perhaps the author might have had a more realistic perspective of what trade actions constitute protectionism if he had consulted with the people actually on the front lines from the Canadian side of the issue. In the bibliography, Moens cites 75 American sources of information, but only 23 Canadian. He doesn't mention whether he'd been in contact with the Alberta government or the Alberta Beef Producers, two parties who were central to the issue. Yet America's National Cattlemen's Beef Association is extensively quoted. The only mention of a Canadian cattle organization is a reference to comments from a second-level official with the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. An American bias by the author is not beyond reason.
Perhaps Moens was unaware of who was on the front lines of the issue, resulting in his preference for U.S. perspectives. Nonetheless, it's no excuse for the report making arbitrary conclusions that defy what was and continues to go on with the BSE issue at the border.
Will Verboven - Monday,22 May 2006
Western Standard
In March, the Fraser Institute released a report entitled Mad Cow: A Case Study in Canadian-American Relations. While the Vancouver-based think-tank is renowned for its careful research and reports on topics affecting the Canadian economy and society in general, this report raises some concerns from the very start.
First of all, while it may seem trivial, the author, Alexander Moens, uses the term "mad cow" in the title and throughout the report. Although the correct name, BSE, is also used, it's disconcerting that a professionally commissioned document would even use a colloquialism employed by the media strictly for fear-mongering purposes. Within the agricultural industry and government agencies, "mad cow" is almost never used.
The report in general is a good compilation of the events surrounding the BSE crisis, its impact on the cattle economy and the roles of the various stakeholders. But having said that, one is confronted with an astonishing conclusion and some glaring omissions in the research. One might attribute some of this to the lofty perch of the author at Simon Fraser University in B.C.--far from the centre of the issue in Alberta.
The most startling statement in the report is in the executive summary, which states, "The United States government did not engage in protectionist or arbitrary actions." That statement alone would have amazed many in the industry who served on the front lines fighting the issue at the political and governmental level--most of whom receive scant if any mention in this report.
What the author does not make clear is what constitutes his definition of protectionism. One could assume from the author's perspective that the softwood lumber issue or any trade issue for that matter is not protectionist as long as U.S. government agencies operate in an administrative and legal manner. That's a rather naive assumption that senior civil servants are ignorant of the political winds swirling around them on a sensitive trade issue. Granted, court challenges have caused delays, but import issues are always good for political fodder at election time, a factor that senior U.S. bureaucrats are keenly aware of, particularly if they cherish their jobs.
The simple fact is that Washington's reaction in closing the border and stalling the reopening process (limitations persist even to this day) was not based on science and therefore clearly had protectionist motives. The report tries to give credence to the science-based actions of the U.S., but how does one reconcile that with the fact that the Canadian government has not once restricted the consumption of domestic beef, based on their own version of the science. The report gives the appearance that the Americans' perception of the science trumps the Canadian version and so the border closure was justified. That's strictly political science.
Curiously, Moens does an in-depth review of the political and protectionist forces within the U.S. that pressured government agencies to keep the border closed. He notes that those pressures were instrumental in delaying the reopening of the border to cattle and beef products. It would seem that is the point of protectionism, with time and delay being part of the process. Hence, we still have trade problems with softwood lumber and live cattle.
Perhaps the author might have had a more realistic perspective of what trade actions constitute protectionism if he had consulted with the people actually on the front lines from the Canadian side of the issue. In the bibliography, Moens cites 75 American sources of information, but only 23 Canadian. He doesn't mention whether he'd been in contact with the Alberta government or the Alberta Beef Producers, two parties who were central to the issue. Yet America's National Cattlemen's Beef Association is extensively quoted. The only mention of a Canadian cattle organization is a reference to comments from a second-level official with the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. An American bias by the author is not beyond reason.
Perhaps Moens was unaware of who was on the front lines of the issue, resulting in his preference for U.S. perspectives. Nonetheless, it's no excuse for the report making arbitrary conclusions that defy what was and continues to go on with the BSE issue at the border.