MF Global > Corzinne > Tree > Rope

[parsley]

Corzinne: "I want this suit made with black silk."

Hong Kong taylor: "Silk it is, sir. You realize you
will no longer be able to dress on either the right
OR on the left side of your trousers?"

Corzinne: "Yes, your assistant told me. How did
you solve the problem?"

Hong Kong taylor : " Your stretched appendages
will fit loosley into a soft silk pouch fashioned on
the inside hem of the trousers. We'll enlarge the
cuff to disguise your , er, individuality."

Corzinne: "Will I trip on them?"

Hong Kong talor: "I wouldnt if I were you."
Pars

[parsley]

From the Chicago Tribune :
"For months we've wondered when the powers-
that-be in the futures industry would explain how
their biggest trading firm could lose a billion or so
dollars in customer funds that supposedly were
secured in separate, regulated accounts.

Finally, we got an answer: Edith 

Edith O'Brien? Let us explain:
O'Brien served as a treasury official at MF Global.
Its collapse last fall left thousands of blameless
customers holding the bag. Many are still owed
large amounts of money.
For decades, the futures industry promised to
keep customer funds safe. For decades, it did.
Then when MF went down, the industry reneged
on its promise. Customers were not made whole.
Their funds apparently could just walk off,
assurances to the contrary notwithstanding.

MF set a terrible precedent for a business vital to
Chicago's economic future. Getting to the bottom
of what happened is crucially important. The
systemic flaws that enabled MF to swipe its
customers' money must be corrected. Only then
can the futures industry begin to rebuild its
damaged credibility.

Which brings us to O'Brien.

Many powerful people and institutions have
stopped short of accepting responsibility for MF.
Those same people and institutions, it seems, are
pointing the finger at O'Brien and her back-office
colleagues at the firm. Her name has come up
dozens of times in media coverage, congressional
testimony and even, reportedly, in grand jury
proceedings. No one connected to MF has been
accused of wrongdoing.

No one knows yet exactly what O'Brien did in
MF's back office during the crucial moments last
October. That's when the firm ran out of cash,
after months of financial strain had given ample
warning to its regulators.

MF boss Jon Corzine, the former New Jersey
governor, U.S. senator and big-shot financier, has
said that he called the back office in Chicago as
his firm's troubles mounted. On Oct. 28, he
directed O'Brien to transfer $175 million to one of
the firm's London bank accounts, which had been
overdrawn. If customer funds were used to cover
the overdraft, he has said, no one alerted him.
When the bank asked O'Brien to sign a document
verifying that the fund transfer did not compromise
customer accounts, however, O'Brien reportedly
refused to sign.

We know what happened next: MF failed. Its
collapse occurred under the noses of CME Group,
its primary regulator and the first line of defense
for its customers, as well as the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, the federal agency
responsible for overseeing CME and the rest of
the industry.

Blaming O'Brien and the back-office staff for MF's
shortfall in customer funds sounds to us like
blaming Mrs. O'Leary's cow for the Great Chicago
Fire.

Never mind the dry weather, high wind and lax
building codes that made the city a tinderbox.
Blame the cow.

Over the last few days, a leaked House Financial
Services Committee memo added to confusion by
suggesting Corzine knew customer funds were
included when he ordered the $175 million
transfer. That, though, apparently has not been
established. Not all the evidence is yet available
for public scrutiny. The focus will fall back on
O'Brien this week, when she and other MF Global
execs are scheduled to appear before a Financial
Services subcommittee.

Much like Chicago in 1871, dangerous conditions
were allowed to prevail at MF. To avert the next
disaster, this homegrown Chicago industry needs
an honest appraisal of its regulatory failure. It
needs to adopt a new regulatory scheme that will
prevent any future MF Globals.

The leaders of the futures business need to
consider how another debacle — or the rumor of
an impending debacle — would send their
remaining customers scrambling for the exits.
CME, in particular, would be better off in the long
run by making its customers whole, instead of
trying to prop up its stock price through a massive
dividend increase, as it recently approved.
Change is necessary, and it will be costly."