Monday » July 21 » 2008
Our goal in Geneva? Undermine the feds
Alberta agriculture industry should work against federal government's position during World Trade Organization meeting
Helmut Mach
Freelance
Monday, July 21, 2008
Today, a week long World Trade Organization "mini" ministerial meeting will be held in Geneva. This meeting, bringing together 30 or so of the most important member countries, will try to forge a negotiated conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda, the current round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
If this smaller, representative, important group is successful, the results would be submitted to the full 150-plus membership of the WTO for consideration. This initiative is being taken to try to bring a successful conclusion to the more than seven years of negotiations which have already occurred, before elections on the horizon in the U.S.,
Europe and elsewhere, derail the negotiations for another few years. The current economic circumstances of high food prices, shortages and inadequate food and agricultural production in many developing countries provide added impetus to try to conclude these negotiations successfully now.
Alberta and other Canadian export and market-oriented agricultural industry and sector representatives will be in Geneva trying to influence the outcome of these critical negotiations. It is important for them to focus on their specific purpose in being in Geneva -- to pursue what is in the best interests of their industry, their sector, their organization, their company, and themselves. Why? Because the Canadian federal government will not be taking care of, nor pursuing these Alberta, western Canadian and trade-liberalization interests. And, the provincial governments cannot look after these industry interests.
While it may be possible for the federal minister and federal negotiators to revise Canada's negotiating approach, abandon their priorities which they have had since 2001, which has been to focus on preserving the status of import sensitive products in Canada to the greatest extent possible, this is unlikely to happen.
It is very unlikely that the federal minister or federal negotiators will even say anything at all with respect to enhancing market access and furthering trade liberalization for the benefit of Canada's export and market-oriented agricultural industries.
While it is very desirable, and even necessary for ministers from
Alberta and Saskatchewan to be in Geneva to argue the case for the export and market-oriented agriculture sectors, the provincial governments cannot direct the negotiators. Only the federal minister can do this.
From the federal government's perspective, its political priorities are with trying to maintain, and if possible, bolster support they might receive from rural areas of Quebec and Ontario, the areas which have a preponderance of supply-managed, import-sensitive sector producers, particularly dairy and dairy products.
From the federal government's perspective, Western Canadian producers and other components of the export and market-oriented agricultural sectors really have no other political home other than the Conservative party. Politically, their fortunes can only change in Quebec and Ontario. Thus they will focus on being seen to be as supportive and protective as possible of supply-managed, sensitive product sectors.
What then should be the objective of industry representatives' activities in Geneva? Without a doubt, the only real objective, to be blunt, is to undermine the Canadian government's negotiating approach on sensitive products. It is only by continuing to demonstrate the inadequacies, contradictions and economically unjustifiable consequences of the Canadian approach on sensitive products that others can be convinced to
ignore the Canadian negotiating approach. It is important for Canadian industry representatives to focus on their particular interests and to be able to provide specific examples that a particular approach on sensitive products would have detrimental consequences for the export sector "x" by constraining market access into country "y" by specific circumstances.
Considering this purpose and objectives, what then should be industry tactics?
Certainly it is important for Canadian industry representatives to meet with the Canadian minister and provincial ministers in Geneva and to meet with Canadian federal negotiators to reinforce the needs of the export and market-oriented sectors.
It should be recognized that responses from some elements of the Canadian
negotiating team may be to argue for the need to be "reasonable," to "consider the larger picture," to urge Canadian industry representatives to offer "compromises," and to assist in pursuing a "balanced approach." It is important for Canadian industry representatives to reject all these requests.
There is no reason to compromise a Canadian negotiating approach nor to have a "balanced" Canadian approach. Canadian industry representatives should not allow themselves to be put into the place of the negotiators. The Canadian industry representatives should pursue their interests and expect and demand that the negotiating team achieve them. The Canadian agriculture sector is over 90 per cent export or market-oriented, with less than 10 per cent dependent upon sensitive product protection. In these circumstances, the "balanced" approach that gives somewhere near equal weighting to the export and import sensitive concerns is actually detrimentally unbalanced.
While it is necessary to deal with the federal minister and the federal negotiating team, it is much more important to attempt to influence other delegations and to undermine the Canadian negotiating approach by reassuring them that Canada will accept the outcome of the negotiations regardless of the effect on Canada's sensitive product sectors.
Export-minded delegations could be advised that the former federal minister of international trade had already met with his provincial counterparts and advised them that regardless of the outcome in agriculture related to sensitive products, that Canada would accept a deal, as its overall interests in the WTO were much too large to reject any outcome, even if it significantly affected supply managed sectors. Everyone should already know this, but this should be reinforced with other delegations essentially urging them to ignore Canadian federal negotiating initiatives related to sensitive products and rather,
focus on cutting the best deal possible in the circumstances with serious negotiators. Canada's negotiating approach certainly does not entitle it to the designation of being a "serious negotiator."
The WTO negotiations provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity to influence a change in international rules affecting domestic agricultural policy such as domestic support, and international rules dealing with export subsidies and market access.
Missing this opportunity means waiting another 10 to 15 years before multilaterally agreed-upon rules might be once again open for change. Thus, I would urge Canadian agricultural industry representatives advancing export and market-oriented policies to be in Geneva in large numbers, to be active, to be vocal, and always to keep in mind their purpose, objective and tactics.
Helmut Mach is a professor and director of the Western Centre for Economic Research at the U of A's school of business.
© The Edmonton Journal 2008
Our goal in Geneva? Undermine the feds
Alberta agriculture industry should work against federal government's position during World Trade Organization meeting
Helmut Mach
Freelance
Monday, July 21, 2008
Today, a week long World Trade Organization "mini" ministerial meeting will be held in Geneva. This meeting, bringing together 30 or so of the most important member countries, will try to forge a negotiated conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda, the current round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
If this smaller, representative, important group is successful, the results would be submitted to the full 150-plus membership of the WTO for consideration. This initiative is being taken to try to bring a successful conclusion to the more than seven years of negotiations which have already occurred, before elections on the horizon in the U.S.,
Europe and elsewhere, derail the negotiations for another few years. The current economic circumstances of high food prices, shortages and inadequate food and agricultural production in many developing countries provide added impetus to try to conclude these negotiations successfully now.
Alberta and other Canadian export and market-oriented agricultural industry and sector representatives will be in Geneva trying to influence the outcome of these critical negotiations. It is important for them to focus on their specific purpose in being in Geneva -- to pursue what is in the best interests of their industry, their sector, their organization, their company, and themselves. Why? Because the Canadian federal government will not be taking care of, nor pursuing these Alberta, western Canadian and trade-liberalization interests. And, the provincial governments cannot look after these industry interests.
While it may be possible for the federal minister and federal negotiators to revise Canada's negotiating approach, abandon their priorities which they have had since 2001, which has been to focus on preserving the status of import sensitive products in Canada to the greatest extent possible, this is unlikely to happen.
It is very unlikely that the federal minister or federal negotiators will even say anything at all with respect to enhancing market access and furthering trade liberalization for the benefit of Canada's export and market-oriented agricultural industries.
While it is very desirable, and even necessary for ministers from
Alberta and Saskatchewan to be in Geneva to argue the case for the export and market-oriented agriculture sectors, the provincial governments cannot direct the negotiators. Only the federal minister can do this.
From the federal government's perspective, its political priorities are with trying to maintain, and if possible, bolster support they might receive from rural areas of Quebec and Ontario, the areas which have a preponderance of supply-managed, import-sensitive sector producers, particularly dairy and dairy products.
From the federal government's perspective, Western Canadian producers and other components of the export and market-oriented agricultural sectors really have no other political home other than the Conservative party. Politically, their fortunes can only change in Quebec and Ontario. Thus they will focus on being seen to be as supportive and protective as possible of supply-managed, sensitive product sectors.
What then should be the objective of industry representatives' activities in Geneva? Without a doubt, the only real objective, to be blunt, is to undermine the Canadian government's negotiating approach on sensitive products. It is only by continuing to demonstrate the inadequacies, contradictions and economically unjustifiable consequences of the Canadian approach on sensitive products that others can be convinced to
ignore the Canadian negotiating approach. It is important for Canadian industry representatives to focus on their particular interests and to be able to provide specific examples that a particular approach on sensitive products would have detrimental consequences for the export sector "x" by constraining market access into country "y" by specific circumstances.
Considering this purpose and objectives, what then should be industry tactics?
Certainly it is important for Canadian industry representatives to meet with the Canadian minister and provincial ministers in Geneva and to meet with Canadian federal negotiators to reinforce the needs of the export and market-oriented sectors.
It should be recognized that responses from some elements of the Canadian
negotiating team may be to argue for the need to be "reasonable," to "consider the larger picture," to urge Canadian industry representatives to offer "compromises," and to assist in pursuing a "balanced approach." It is important for Canadian industry representatives to reject all these requests.
There is no reason to compromise a Canadian negotiating approach nor to have a "balanced" Canadian approach. Canadian industry representatives should not allow themselves to be put into the place of the negotiators. The Canadian industry representatives should pursue their interests and expect and demand that the negotiating team achieve them. The Canadian agriculture sector is over 90 per cent export or market-oriented, with less than 10 per cent dependent upon sensitive product protection. In these circumstances, the "balanced" approach that gives somewhere near equal weighting to the export and import sensitive concerns is actually detrimentally unbalanced.
While it is necessary to deal with the federal minister and the federal negotiating team, it is much more important to attempt to influence other delegations and to undermine the Canadian negotiating approach by reassuring them that Canada will accept the outcome of the negotiations regardless of the effect on Canada's sensitive product sectors.
Export-minded delegations could be advised that the former federal minister of international trade had already met with his provincial counterparts and advised them that regardless of the outcome in agriculture related to sensitive products, that Canada would accept a deal, as its overall interests in the WTO were much too large to reject any outcome, even if it significantly affected supply managed sectors. Everyone should already know this, but this should be reinforced with other delegations essentially urging them to ignore Canadian federal negotiating initiatives related to sensitive products and rather,
focus on cutting the best deal possible in the circumstances with serious negotiators. Canada's negotiating approach certainly does not entitle it to the designation of being a "serious negotiator."
The WTO negotiations provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity to influence a change in international rules affecting domestic agricultural policy such as domestic support, and international rules dealing with export subsidies and market access.
Missing this opportunity means waiting another 10 to 15 years before multilaterally agreed-upon rules might be once again open for change. Thus, I would urge Canadian agricultural industry representatives advancing export and market-oriented policies to be in Geneva in large numbers, to be active, to be vocal, and always to keep in mind their purpose, objective and tactics.
Helmut Mach is a professor and director of the Western Centre for Economic Research at the U of A's school of business.
© The Edmonton Journal 2008
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