http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2010/2009fca214.html
[49] These changes do point to an increased role for the board of directors. However, when these amendments were brought, subsection 18(1) was not only preserved but strengthened. Beyond subsection 3.12(2) which sets out the directors’ duty to comply with any direction given pursuant to subsection 18(1), subsection 18(1.2) was added to provide that compliance with a direction is “deemed” to be in the best interest of the Wheat Board. At the same time, the directors were relieved from liability which could arise from such compliance (subsection 18(1.1)).
[59] The Wheat Board is a creature of statute and as such, it has no powers, rights and duties save those bestowed on it by the Act. Since I have found that as a result of the Direction Order the Wheat Board has no authority under the Act to use producer funds to advocate against government policy, there is no Charter right to protect pursuant to paragraph 2(b).
[49] These changes do point to an increased role for the board of directors. However, when these amendments were brought, subsection 18(1) was not only preserved but strengthened. Beyond subsection 3.12(2) which sets out the directors’ duty to comply with any direction given pursuant to subsection 18(1), subsection 18(1.2) was added to provide that compliance with a direction is “deemed” to be in the best interest of the Wheat Board. At the same time, the directors were relieved from liability which could arise from such compliance (subsection 18(1.1)).
[59] The Wheat Board is a creature of statute and as such, it has no powers, rights and duties save those bestowed on it by the Act. Since I have found that as a result of the Direction Order the Wheat Board has no authority under the Act to use producer funds to advocate against government policy, there is no Charter right to protect pursuant to paragraph 2(b).
Comment