Dropping the bundle
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Australia might have nipped the Iraq wheat scandal in the bud if it had chosen to look more closely at what was not being said, writes David Marr.
THIS is bullshit," said the man from AWB and that was good enough for the Government.
In late January 2000, Canberra was moving in a leisurely way to deal with allegations coming from deep within the United Nations that the national wheat trader AWB was sanctions busting.
Disbelief greeted the charge when it reached Bob Bowker, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Middle East branch, in the middle of the month. He reassured Australian diplomats in New York: "We think it unlikely that AWB would be involved knowingly in any form of payment in breach of the sanctions regime."
Why was he so certain? Because the month before, AWB had assured him it was "fully aware of, and respected, Australian Government obligations and UN Security Council sensitivities and would act accordingly".
We know now - and AWB executives knew then - that this was a lie. At this time, AWB was paying its first corrupt "trucking fees" to Iraq. The system that would eventually yield Saddam Hussein's regime a fortune in bribes and kickbacks was in its very early days. What follows is the story of Australia's failure to nip the whole system in the bud.
What Canberra had learnt by cable from its UN mission was that Iraq was pressuring a "third country" - easily identified as Canada - to make payments "outside the oil-for-food program". Iraq was claiming these payments were already being made by AWB.
It was absolutely true.
Bowker's response was highly curious. This senior Foreign Affairs official sent his reassuring cable to Australia's diplomats at the UN before putting the allegation to anyone at AWB. Sometime in the following week, Bowker rang the wheat trader's chief of "government relations", Andrew McConville, who assured him it was all "bullshit" and emphatically denied the allegations.
It's not clear Bowker even bothered to pass AWB's denials to Australia's UN mission. It seems over in New York the denials had already been made. But what is known is that neither Felicity Johnston, chief customs expert at the UN's Office of the Iraq Program, nor the Canadians were satisfied with Australia's response. Canada was threatening to make its complaint official and public.
After letting the matter lie for a month, Johnston had another go - this time bypassing Australia's diplomats at the UN and raising the matter with the trade commissioner, Alistair Nicholas. His was an entirely different response. Within about 10 days he was putting the problem to AWB's chairman, Trevor Flugge, its New York representative, Tim Snowball, and McConville at a meeting in Washington.
They were furious at this intrusion into their affairs. The executives played down the issue. This perturbed Nicholas even more. He reported back to Canberra: "Trade Commissioner is concerned that AWB do not understand the seriousness nor the urgency of the matter. It may be necessary to advise the minister of the situation." He meant the Trade Minister, Mark Vaile.
What's clear from written accounts of that meeting is that they discussed trucking fees. Canada's original complaint was about "transportation costs" and the claim that AWB was already paying them. By this time, Canada had been officially informed by the UN not to pay "transport costs of wheat within Iraq". At the heart of this crisis for Australia and AWB were these bogus trucking fees.
But here's a strange thing: while AWB emails at this time were headed "UN Inquiry Concerning Trucking Fees", none of the diplomatic cables so far produced at the Cole inquiry say anything about this. They talk of payments "in breach of the sanctions regime" and possible "irregularities in [AWB's] dealings with Iraq". But nothing about trucking.
Was this an accident? A crucial issue for the Cole inquiry to pursue over the next few weeks is the strange redrafting of the terms of complaint in these official documents being read at higher and higher levels in Canberra - because this shift was to give AWB and the Government a way to escape the UN's allegations.
Rather naively, UN officials believed there must be a written contract somewhere setting out the terms of the "trucking fees". The truth - that AWB was paying millions of dollars per ship without any written contract - was too bizarre for these men and women to comprehend. They wondered if the written terms might lie hidden in the "standard terms and conditions" referred to - but not spelt out - in the AWB grain contracts regularly inspected by the UN.
This came up at the Washington meeting. Afterwards, Snowball emailed AWB headquarters in Melbourne: "If all the UN wants is some understanding on our standard terms and conditions in AWB contracts then I think we have nothing to worry about." He also rang Bronte Moules at Australia's UN mission to persuade her to sideline Austrade. She reported to Canberra: "We understand AWB's preference is that follow-up discussions be pursued with [the department], but with Austrade kept in the loop."
Moules's cable was heavy on reassurance, light on details of the allegations and didn't name Canada. Another pattern was emerging by this time: the more positive the cables were about AWB, the higher they went into Canberra's bureaucratic stratosphere. But no evidence has emerged that any of these deputy secretaries - and eventually Howard Government ministers - ever asked what exactly AWB was accused of doing and what exactly was the wheat trader's response.
Moules glowed. "While all indications from the AWB are, as expected, that the concerns of the [UN] and the third country have no basis, until we are able to provide a formal reassurance of this, there will remain a question mark over the matter."
Her message to Canberra was that once AWB gave the UN a copy of its "standard terms and conditions", the crisis would pass.
AWB had a more nuanced understanding: Canada had also to be squared away. In the days after the Washington meeting, McConville and Flugge flew north to meet Canadian Wheat Board officials over breakfast in Winnipeg, and executives of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool at a transit hotel at Vancouver Airport.
Though a haze of amnesia descended on these men when they appeared before the Cole inquiry, it's clear they were mounting a big effort to ingratiate the AWB with the Canadians, who had an immediate problem: as part of its effort to force them to pay "trucking fees", Iraq was refusing to unload Canadian ships.
Australia was there to help. Snowball jotted a note in his diary: "Trevor wants to keep alongside them - see if we could help them … mkts to put the cargoes into."
What happened there is unknown, but it is clear that Canada, which had been pursuing its complaints against Australia fairly vigorously, let them drop. Over the following year, Canada was to send a further 300,000 tonnes of wheat to Iraq through an "accredited exporter". None of those ships would have been landed without paying "trucking fees".
Back in Canberra, Foreign Affairs was not going to force AWB to hand over its "standard terms and conditions". The wheat trader was calling the shots. In a fax to AWB's New York office, McConville wrote: "Spoken with Canberra - they are OK with waiting for Mark's OK." He explained to the Cole inquiry last week what he meant: that Foreign Affairs was happy to let AWB's Mark Emons decide what went back to the UN.
But Emons was the executive who designed the machinery for paying - and hiding - the trucking fees. At this point he was still bedding down the system. He has given clear evidence to Cole that he knew right from the start these fees were a breach of UN sanctions. He has also told the commissioner that the "standard terms and conditions" of AWB contracts had nothing at all to do with Canada's complaint to the UN.
News that AWB had decided to provide the documents was sent in a jubilant cable from Bowker to the UN mission in late March 2000. The cable was copied all round Canberra to the highest levels, including to the Minister for Trade and the Prime Minister. This distribution list clearly indicates that the UN's inquiries about AWB had been discussed at the highest levels.
The UN received the documents on April 5, 2002. The Australian mission cabled back that the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) "has confirmed that this clarifies the matter and removes any grounds for misperception".
It was another three years before the UN's tough-minded investigator, Paul Volcker, looked at this and wondered what had happened to the original, clearly focused - and accurate - complaint that had come to the UN in late 1999. His people interviewed an unnamed Australian official, almost certainly Moules: "The official did not recall the issue of inland transport being discussed with anyone from OIP or the UN."
Cole will have to decide if this was an appalling oversight, a brilliant snow job or a superb bureaucratic operation in defence of an iconic Australian corporation. The result was the same: AWB would pay almost $300 million in bribes to Saddam.
They were furious at this intrusion into their affairs. The executives played down the issue. This perturbed Nicholas even more. He reported back to Canberra: "Trade Commissioner is concerned that AWB do not understand the seriousness nor the urgency of the matter. It may be necessary to advise the minister of the situation." He meant the Trade Minister, Mark Vaile.
What's clear from written accounts of that meeting is that they discussed trucking fees. Canada's original complaint was about "transportation costs" and the claim that AWB was already paying them. By this time, Canada had been officially informed by the UN not to pay "transport costs of wheat within Iraq". At the heart of this crisis for Australia and AWB were these bogus trucking fees.
But here's a strange thing: while AWB emails at this time were headed "UN Inquiry Concerning Trucking Fees", none of the diplomatic cables so far produced at the Cole inquiry say anything about this. They talk of payments "in breach of the sanctions regime" and possible "irregularities in [AWB's] dealings with Iraq". But nothing about trucking.
Was this an accident? A crucial issue for the Cole inquiry to pursue over the next few weeks is the strange redrafting of the terms of complaint in these official documents being read at higher and higher levels in Canberra - because this shift was to give AWB and the Government a way to escape the UN's allegations.
Rather naively, UN officials believed there must be a written contract somewhere setting out the terms of the "trucking fees". The truth - that AWB was paying millions of dollars per ship without any written contract - was too bizarre for these men and women to comprehend. They wondered if the written terms might lie hidden in the "standard terms and conditions" referred to - but not spelt out - in the AWB grain contracts regularly inspected by the UN.
This came up at the Washington meeting. Afterwards, Snowball emailed AWB headquarters in Melbourne: "If all the UN wants is some understanding on our standard terms and conditions in AWB contracts then I think we have nothing to worry about." He also rang Bronte Moules at Australia's UN mission to persuade her to sideline Austrade. She reported to Canberra: "We understand AWB's preference is that follow-up discussions be pursued with [the department], but with Austrade kept in the loop."
Moules's cable was heavy on reassurance, light on details of the allegations and didn't name Canada. Another pattern was emerging by this time: the more positive the cables were about AWB, the higher they went into Canberra's bureaucratic stratosphere. But no evidence has emerged that any of these deputy secretaries - and eventually Howard Government ministers - ever asked what exactly AWB was accused of doing and what exactly was the wheat trader's response.
Moules glowed. "While all indications from the AWB are, as expected, that the concerns of the [UN] and the third country have no basis, until we are able to provide a formal reassurance of this, there will remain a question mark over the matter."
Her message to Canberra was that once AWB gave the UN a copy of its "standard terms and conditions", the crisis would pass.
AWB had a more nuanced understanding: Canada had also to be squared away. In the days after the Washington meeting, McConville and Flugge flew north to meet Canadian Wheat Board officials over breakfast in Winnipeg, and executives of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool at a transit hotel at Vancouver Airport.
Though a haze of amnesia descended on these men when they appeared before the Cole inquiry, it's clear they were mounting a big effort to ingratiate the AWB with the Canadians, who had an immediate problem: as part of its effort to force them to pay "trucking fees", Iraq was refusing to unload Canadian ships.
Australia was there to help. Snowball jotted a note in his diary: "Trevor wants to keep alongside them - see if we could help them … mkts to put the cargoes into."
What happened there is unknown, but it is clear that Canada, which had been pursuing its complaints against Australia fairly vigorously, let them drop. Over the following year, Canada was to send a further 300,000 tonnes of wheat to Iraq through an "accredited exporter". None of those ships would have been landed without paying "trucking fees".
Back in Canberra, Foreign Affairs was not going to force AWB to hand over its "standard terms and conditions". The wheat trader was calling the shots. In a fax to AWB's New York office, McConville wrote: "Spoken with Canberra - they are OK with waiting for Mark's OK." He explained to the Cole inquiry last week what he meant: that Foreign Affairs was happy to let AWB's Mark Emons decide what went back to the UN.
But Emons was the executive who designed the machinery for paying - and hiding - the trucking fees. At this point he was still bedding down the system. He has given clear evidence to Cole that he knew right from the start these fees were a breach of UN sanctions. He has also told the commissioner that the "standard terms and conditions" of AWB contracts had nothing at all to do with Canada's complaint to the UN.
News that AWB had decided to provide the documents was sent in a jubilant cable from Bowker to the UN mission in late March 2000. The cable was copied all round Canberra to the highest levels, including to the Minister for Trade and the Prime Minister. This distribution list clearly indicates that the UN's inquiries about AWB had been discussed at the highest levels.
The UN received the documents on April 5, 2002. The Australian mission cabled back that the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) "has confirmed that this clarifies the matter and removes any grounds for misperception".
It was another three years before the UN's tough-minded investigator, Paul Volcker, looked at this and wondered what had happened to the original, clearly focused - and accurate - complaint that had come to the UN in late 1999. His people interviewed an unnamed Australian official, almost certainly Moules: "The official did not recall the issue of inland transport being discussed with anyone from OIP or the UN."
Cole will have to decide if this was an appalling oversight, a brilliant snow job or a superb bureaucratic operation in defence of an iconic Australian corporation. The result was the same: AWB would pay almost $300 million in bribes to Saddam.
Email Print Normal font Large font March 4, 2006
Page 1 of 3 | Single page
Australia might have nipped the Iraq wheat scandal in the bud if it had chosen to look more closely at what was not being said, writes David Marr.
THIS is bullshit," said the man from AWB and that was good enough for the Government.
In late January 2000, Canberra was moving in a leisurely way to deal with allegations coming from deep within the United Nations that the national wheat trader AWB was sanctions busting.
Disbelief greeted the charge when it reached Bob Bowker, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Middle East branch, in the middle of the month. He reassured Australian diplomats in New York: "We think it unlikely that AWB would be involved knowingly in any form of payment in breach of the sanctions regime."
Why was he so certain? Because the month before, AWB had assured him it was "fully aware of, and respected, Australian Government obligations and UN Security Council sensitivities and would act accordingly".
We know now - and AWB executives knew then - that this was a lie. At this time, AWB was paying its first corrupt "trucking fees" to Iraq. The system that would eventually yield Saddam Hussein's regime a fortune in bribes and kickbacks was in its very early days. What follows is the story of Australia's failure to nip the whole system in the bud.
What Canberra had learnt by cable from its UN mission was that Iraq was pressuring a "third country" - easily identified as Canada - to make payments "outside the oil-for-food program". Iraq was claiming these payments were already being made by AWB.
It was absolutely true.
Bowker's response was highly curious. This senior Foreign Affairs official sent his reassuring cable to Australia's diplomats at the UN before putting the allegation to anyone at AWB. Sometime in the following week, Bowker rang the wheat trader's chief of "government relations", Andrew McConville, who assured him it was all "bullshit" and emphatically denied the allegations.
It's not clear Bowker even bothered to pass AWB's denials to Australia's UN mission. It seems over in New York the denials had already been made. But what is known is that neither Felicity Johnston, chief customs expert at the UN's Office of the Iraq Program, nor the Canadians were satisfied with Australia's response. Canada was threatening to make its complaint official and public.
After letting the matter lie for a month, Johnston had another go - this time bypassing Australia's diplomats at the UN and raising the matter with the trade commissioner, Alistair Nicholas. His was an entirely different response. Within about 10 days he was putting the problem to AWB's chairman, Trevor Flugge, its New York representative, Tim Snowball, and McConville at a meeting in Washington.
They were furious at this intrusion into their affairs. The executives played down the issue. This perturbed Nicholas even more. He reported back to Canberra: "Trade Commissioner is concerned that AWB do not understand the seriousness nor the urgency of the matter. It may be necessary to advise the minister of the situation." He meant the Trade Minister, Mark Vaile.
What's clear from written accounts of that meeting is that they discussed trucking fees. Canada's original complaint was about "transportation costs" and the claim that AWB was already paying them. By this time, Canada had been officially informed by the UN not to pay "transport costs of wheat within Iraq". At the heart of this crisis for Australia and AWB were these bogus trucking fees.
But here's a strange thing: while AWB emails at this time were headed "UN Inquiry Concerning Trucking Fees", none of the diplomatic cables so far produced at the Cole inquiry say anything about this. They talk of payments "in breach of the sanctions regime" and possible "irregularities in [AWB's] dealings with Iraq". But nothing about trucking.
Was this an accident? A crucial issue for the Cole inquiry to pursue over the next few weeks is the strange redrafting of the terms of complaint in these official documents being read at higher and higher levels in Canberra - because this shift was to give AWB and the Government a way to escape the UN's allegations.
Rather naively, UN officials believed there must be a written contract somewhere setting out the terms of the "trucking fees". The truth - that AWB was paying millions of dollars per ship without any written contract - was too bizarre for these men and women to comprehend. They wondered if the written terms might lie hidden in the "standard terms and conditions" referred to - but not spelt out - in the AWB grain contracts regularly inspected by the UN.
This came up at the Washington meeting. Afterwards, Snowball emailed AWB headquarters in Melbourne: "If all the UN wants is some understanding on our standard terms and conditions in AWB contracts then I think we have nothing to worry about." He also rang Bronte Moules at Australia's UN mission to persuade her to sideline Austrade. She reported to Canberra: "We understand AWB's preference is that follow-up discussions be pursued with [the department], but with Austrade kept in the loop."
Moules's cable was heavy on reassurance, light on details of the allegations and didn't name Canada. Another pattern was emerging by this time: the more positive the cables were about AWB, the higher they went into Canberra's bureaucratic stratosphere. But no evidence has emerged that any of these deputy secretaries - and eventually Howard Government ministers - ever asked what exactly AWB was accused of doing and what exactly was the wheat trader's response.
Moules glowed. "While all indications from the AWB are, as expected, that the concerns of the [UN] and the third country have no basis, until we are able to provide a formal reassurance of this, there will remain a question mark over the matter."
Her message to Canberra was that once AWB gave the UN a copy of its "standard terms and conditions", the crisis would pass.
AWB had a more nuanced understanding: Canada had also to be squared away. In the days after the Washington meeting, McConville and Flugge flew north to meet Canadian Wheat Board officials over breakfast in Winnipeg, and executives of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool at a transit hotel at Vancouver Airport.
Though a haze of amnesia descended on these men when they appeared before the Cole inquiry, it's clear they were mounting a big effort to ingratiate the AWB with the Canadians, who had an immediate problem: as part of its effort to force them to pay "trucking fees", Iraq was refusing to unload Canadian ships.
Australia was there to help. Snowball jotted a note in his diary: "Trevor wants to keep alongside them - see if we could help them … mkts to put the cargoes into."
What happened there is unknown, but it is clear that Canada, which had been pursuing its complaints against Australia fairly vigorously, let them drop. Over the following year, Canada was to send a further 300,000 tonnes of wheat to Iraq through an "accredited exporter". None of those ships would have been landed without paying "trucking fees".
Back in Canberra, Foreign Affairs was not going to force AWB to hand over its "standard terms and conditions". The wheat trader was calling the shots. In a fax to AWB's New York office, McConville wrote: "Spoken with Canberra - they are OK with waiting for Mark's OK." He explained to the Cole inquiry last week what he meant: that Foreign Affairs was happy to let AWB's Mark Emons decide what went back to the UN.
But Emons was the executive who designed the machinery for paying - and hiding - the trucking fees. At this point he was still bedding down the system. He has given clear evidence to Cole that he knew right from the start these fees were a breach of UN sanctions. He has also told the commissioner that the "standard terms and conditions" of AWB contracts had nothing at all to do with Canada's complaint to the UN.
News that AWB had decided to provide the documents was sent in a jubilant cable from Bowker to the UN mission in late March 2000. The cable was copied all round Canberra to the highest levels, including to the Minister for Trade and the Prime Minister. This distribution list clearly indicates that the UN's inquiries about AWB had been discussed at the highest levels.
The UN received the documents on April 5, 2002. The Australian mission cabled back that the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) "has confirmed that this clarifies the matter and removes any grounds for misperception".
It was another three years before the UN's tough-minded investigator, Paul Volcker, looked at this and wondered what had happened to the original, clearly focused - and accurate - complaint that had come to the UN in late 1999. His people interviewed an unnamed Australian official, almost certainly Moules: "The official did not recall the issue of inland transport being discussed with anyone from OIP or the UN."
Cole will have to decide if this was an appalling oversight, a brilliant snow job or a superb bureaucratic operation in defence of an iconic Australian corporation. The result was the same: AWB would pay almost $300 million in bribes to Saddam.
They were furious at this intrusion into their affairs. The executives played down the issue. This perturbed Nicholas even more. He reported back to Canberra: "Trade Commissioner is concerned that AWB do not understand the seriousness nor the urgency of the matter. It may be necessary to advise the minister of the situation." He meant the Trade Minister, Mark Vaile.
What's clear from written accounts of that meeting is that they discussed trucking fees. Canada's original complaint was about "transportation costs" and the claim that AWB was already paying them. By this time, Canada had been officially informed by the UN not to pay "transport costs of wheat within Iraq". At the heart of this crisis for Australia and AWB were these bogus trucking fees.
But here's a strange thing: while AWB emails at this time were headed "UN Inquiry Concerning Trucking Fees", none of the diplomatic cables so far produced at the Cole inquiry say anything about this. They talk of payments "in breach of the sanctions regime" and possible "irregularities in [AWB's] dealings with Iraq". But nothing about trucking.
Was this an accident? A crucial issue for the Cole inquiry to pursue over the next few weeks is the strange redrafting of the terms of complaint in these official documents being read at higher and higher levels in Canberra - because this shift was to give AWB and the Government a way to escape the UN's allegations.
Rather naively, UN officials believed there must be a written contract somewhere setting out the terms of the "trucking fees". The truth - that AWB was paying millions of dollars per ship without any written contract - was too bizarre for these men and women to comprehend. They wondered if the written terms might lie hidden in the "standard terms and conditions" referred to - but not spelt out - in the AWB grain contracts regularly inspected by the UN.
This came up at the Washington meeting. Afterwards, Snowball emailed AWB headquarters in Melbourne: "If all the UN wants is some understanding on our standard terms and conditions in AWB contracts then I think we have nothing to worry about." He also rang Bronte Moules at Australia's UN mission to persuade her to sideline Austrade. She reported to Canberra: "We understand AWB's preference is that follow-up discussions be pursued with [the department], but with Austrade kept in the loop."
Moules's cable was heavy on reassurance, light on details of the allegations and didn't name Canada. Another pattern was emerging by this time: the more positive the cables were about AWB, the higher they went into Canberra's bureaucratic stratosphere. But no evidence has emerged that any of these deputy secretaries - and eventually Howard Government ministers - ever asked what exactly AWB was accused of doing and what exactly was the wheat trader's response.
Moules glowed. "While all indications from the AWB are, as expected, that the concerns of the [UN] and the third country have no basis, until we are able to provide a formal reassurance of this, there will remain a question mark over the matter."
Her message to Canberra was that once AWB gave the UN a copy of its "standard terms and conditions", the crisis would pass.
AWB had a more nuanced understanding: Canada had also to be squared away. In the days after the Washington meeting, McConville and Flugge flew north to meet Canadian Wheat Board officials over breakfast in Winnipeg, and executives of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool at a transit hotel at Vancouver Airport.
Though a haze of amnesia descended on these men when they appeared before the Cole inquiry, it's clear they were mounting a big effort to ingratiate the AWB with the Canadians, who had an immediate problem: as part of its effort to force them to pay "trucking fees", Iraq was refusing to unload Canadian ships.
Australia was there to help. Snowball jotted a note in his diary: "Trevor wants to keep alongside them - see if we could help them … mkts to put the cargoes into."
What happened there is unknown, but it is clear that Canada, which had been pursuing its complaints against Australia fairly vigorously, let them drop. Over the following year, Canada was to send a further 300,000 tonnes of wheat to Iraq through an "accredited exporter". None of those ships would have been landed without paying "trucking fees".
Back in Canberra, Foreign Affairs was not going to force AWB to hand over its "standard terms and conditions". The wheat trader was calling the shots. In a fax to AWB's New York office, McConville wrote: "Spoken with Canberra - they are OK with waiting for Mark's OK." He explained to the Cole inquiry last week what he meant: that Foreign Affairs was happy to let AWB's Mark Emons decide what went back to the UN.
But Emons was the executive who designed the machinery for paying - and hiding - the trucking fees. At this point he was still bedding down the system. He has given clear evidence to Cole that he knew right from the start these fees were a breach of UN sanctions. He has also told the commissioner that the "standard terms and conditions" of AWB contracts had nothing at all to do with Canada's complaint to the UN.
News that AWB had decided to provide the documents was sent in a jubilant cable from Bowker to the UN mission in late March 2000. The cable was copied all round Canberra to the highest levels, including to the Minister for Trade and the Prime Minister. This distribution list clearly indicates that the UN's inquiries about AWB had been discussed at the highest levels.
The UN received the documents on April 5, 2002. The Australian mission cabled back that the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) "has confirmed that this clarifies the matter and removes any grounds for misperception".
It was another three years before the UN's tough-minded investigator, Paul Volcker, looked at this and wondered what had happened to the original, clearly focused - and accurate - complaint that had come to the UN in late 1999. His people interviewed an unnamed Australian official, almost certainly Moules: "The official did not recall the issue of inland transport being discussed with anyone from OIP or the UN."
Cole will have to decide if this was an appalling oversight, a brilliant snow job or a superb bureaucratic operation in defence of an iconic Australian corporation. The result was the same: AWB would pay almost $300 million in bribes to Saddam.
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