The real CWB balance sheet for farmers (in millions of dollars) - for discussion purposes:
Assets – financial benefits of the CWB system
1. Interest revenue $56
2. Premiums to Japan $24
3. Premiums on durum to the US ?
4. Other premiums ?
4. Market development ?
5. Others ?
Liabilities – costs of the CWB system
1. CWB overhead $68
2. Higher handling/storage charges$100
3. Lower non-CWB prices $60
4. Low market impact on large sales ?
5. Community losses from less value added ?
6. Marketing mistakes ?
7. Others ?
Notes on assets:
1. Interest revenue – this was taken from the most recent CWB Annual Report
2. Premiums to Japan – this was taken from another thread – I think Incognito had it figured: 1.2 mmt times $20 per tonne. I think that’s hefty, but let’s go with it.
3. Premium to the US on durum – any thoughts ?
4. Other premiums Any thoughts?
5. Market development – not sure how to quantify this. Again – any thoughts anyone?
Notes on liabilities:
1. CWB overhead – from CWB Annual Report
2. Higher handling/storage charges. Assuming the CWB pays elevated handling fees of about $10 per tonne on 10 mmt (both primary elevator handling and terminal handling), this works out to about $100M.
3. Lower prices for non-CWB – non-CWB crops are used for cash flow because CWB grains don’t provide much cash flow. Over deliveries relative to demand depresses prices (especially in the fall). Assuming $20 per tonne on 3 mmt, this works out to about $60M.
4. Low market impact on large sales – this is the market reality that when the CWB sells large quantities to end users, the market doesn’t feel the impact (this is beneficial to the buyer but not the seller. One reason why millers like the CWB system. Not sure how to quantify this – any ideas?
5. Community losses from less value added – the CWB was an impediment to two value added projects that I know of – Prairie Pasta (may have bought the Borden Pasta plant in Lethbridge (since closed down) if the CWB was more supportive from the beginning) and IMC (malt company that built in Idaho instead of Alberta – because they wanted to deal directly with producers and not the CWB). How much these two losses cost western economies is up for discussion. Any other projects gone awry because of the CWB?
6. Marketing mistakes - believe me, the CWB makes them. After all, the people there are just that – people. For example – a number of years ago a multinational AE sold three cargoes of feed wheat to South Korea. Nothing is secret in the grain trade so the guys at the CWB caught wind of who made the sale. When the AE went to the CWB to negotiate a purchase to cover the sale, he found the CWB particularly firm on their relatively high price for this sale of about 100,000 tonnes – I think it was about $10 per tonne above the market. The CWB was trying to extract a premium from the AE whom the CWB knew to be short. What the CWB didn’t know was that the sale was made on the basis of “optional origin” meaning the seller could cover the sale from where ever they chose. Finding the CWB particularly difficult to deal with, the AE eventually covered the sale out of Australia. Canada lost the sale altogether – in a year when we were swimming in feed wheat. So, instead of extracting a USD $1 million premium, the CWB lost a sale worth, let’s say about USD $10 million.
And let’s not forget the Churchill to Vancouver fiasco.
I’ve intentionally left the lists short – I have more ideas but also want to draw out others. Please add whatever you think should go on either side of this ledger. Whatever is reasonable should go in. The bottom line should reflect the true value of the CWB to farmers in dollar terms.
Assets – financial benefits of the CWB system
1. Interest revenue $56
2. Premiums to Japan $24
3. Premiums on durum to the US ?
4. Other premiums ?
4. Market development ?
5. Others ?
Liabilities – costs of the CWB system
1. CWB overhead $68
2. Higher handling/storage charges$100
3. Lower non-CWB prices $60
4. Low market impact on large sales ?
5. Community losses from less value added ?
6. Marketing mistakes ?
7. Others ?
Notes on assets:
1. Interest revenue – this was taken from the most recent CWB Annual Report
2. Premiums to Japan – this was taken from another thread – I think Incognito had it figured: 1.2 mmt times $20 per tonne. I think that’s hefty, but let’s go with it.
3. Premium to the US on durum – any thoughts ?
4. Other premiums Any thoughts?
5. Market development – not sure how to quantify this. Again – any thoughts anyone?
Notes on liabilities:
1. CWB overhead – from CWB Annual Report
2. Higher handling/storage charges. Assuming the CWB pays elevated handling fees of about $10 per tonne on 10 mmt (both primary elevator handling and terminal handling), this works out to about $100M.
3. Lower prices for non-CWB – non-CWB crops are used for cash flow because CWB grains don’t provide much cash flow. Over deliveries relative to demand depresses prices (especially in the fall). Assuming $20 per tonne on 3 mmt, this works out to about $60M.
4. Low market impact on large sales – this is the market reality that when the CWB sells large quantities to end users, the market doesn’t feel the impact (this is beneficial to the buyer but not the seller. One reason why millers like the CWB system. Not sure how to quantify this – any ideas?
5. Community losses from less value added – the CWB was an impediment to two value added projects that I know of – Prairie Pasta (may have bought the Borden Pasta plant in Lethbridge (since closed down) if the CWB was more supportive from the beginning) and IMC (malt company that built in Idaho instead of Alberta – because they wanted to deal directly with producers and not the CWB). How much these two losses cost western economies is up for discussion. Any other projects gone awry because of the CWB?
6. Marketing mistakes - believe me, the CWB makes them. After all, the people there are just that – people. For example – a number of years ago a multinational AE sold three cargoes of feed wheat to South Korea. Nothing is secret in the grain trade so the guys at the CWB caught wind of who made the sale. When the AE went to the CWB to negotiate a purchase to cover the sale, he found the CWB particularly firm on their relatively high price for this sale of about 100,000 tonnes – I think it was about $10 per tonne above the market. The CWB was trying to extract a premium from the AE whom the CWB knew to be short. What the CWB didn’t know was that the sale was made on the basis of “optional origin” meaning the seller could cover the sale from where ever they chose. Finding the CWB particularly difficult to deal with, the AE eventually covered the sale out of Australia. Canada lost the sale altogether – in a year when we were swimming in feed wheat. So, instead of extracting a USD $1 million premium, the CWB lost a sale worth, let’s say about USD $10 million.
And let’s not forget the Churchill to Vancouver fiasco.
I’ve intentionally left the lists short – I have more ideas but also want to draw out others. Please add whatever you think should go on either side of this ledger. Whatever is reasonable should go in. The bottom line should reflect the true value of the CWB to farmers in dollar terms.
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