Canadian Wheat Board will wilt in deregulated market
Sun Nov 12 2006
Murray Fulton
THE federal government has recently released its task force report on how the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) could be restructured to provide freedom of marketing choice for farmers while, in Agriculture Minister Chuck Strahl's words, "ensuring a strong, viable, voluntary CWB."
Though the task force report insists a new CWB "needs to have a high probability of success," the proposed changes to the CWB would not allow it to survive commercially.
The report calls for the elimination of the current CWB and the creation of CWB II, which would be owned by farmers through a co-operative or corporate structure. It would compete with the other grain companies in an open market, and would be allowed to acquire assets.
But there is no business case for a viable CWB II. It would be unable to obtain the strategic assets necessary to compete.
To function effectively, CWB II would require a way of getting grain from farmers on the prairies to the customers it lines up. It would also require in-depth customer knowledge, a loyal producer base and unique products and services.
Despite the assertions made in the report, none of these assets would be available to CWB II. There are at least four reasons for this.
First, without grain-handling facilities, particularly port facilities, the CWB II would be completely reliant on the existing grain companies to handle its grain.
It would be unable to provide guarantees to customers since the existing companies would much rather handle the grain themselves than for CWB II. And purchasing key facilities from the existing companies is not going to happen, since these players have no interest in allowing a viable CWB II to enter the market.
Second, the report argues that the current CWB's customer knowledge is an asset that would be retained under CWB II.
This argument is faulty. Once it is clear that the CWB is being restructured, the existing grain companies will hire the key sales and logistics people away from the CWB in order to have the expertise they require to operate in the new market. Unless the sales staff is indentured to the CWB -- which, of course, it is not -- the CWB will not retain special advantages in this area.
Third, a large loyal producer base is not a given. The requirement to purchase shares means that a cost-free option to participate in a CWB-like structure would no longer exist. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool found out that changing structure and refocusing its business resulted in a sharp reduction in producer loyalty. A similar reaction can be expected to the change proposed for the CWB.
Fourth, the task force suggests CWB II can serve producers better than its competitors by offering pooled contracts and helping buyers with new products.
But if producers and customers want these services, surely the CWB II's competitors can use the same strategies. Moreover, pooling is virtually impossible to operate in an open market. This is why there are no pools in the grain sector in the U.S. and why we do not see pooled contracts in canola (some will argue that the Ontario Wheat Producers' Marketing Board operates wheat pools, but these pools account for less than five per cent of total grain sales).
Since CWB II will have no significant strategic assets, it will not be commercially viable. Given the expectation that it will not be viable, farmers will have no incentive to purchase shares in it and, as a consequence, CWB II is unlikely to even get established. Thus, the only marketing choice that a farmer will have is, "To which private multinational grain company should I sell?" The government's announcement that it will hold a plebiscite on barley marketing in 2007 is welcome news for those producers who feared the government would ignore the CWB Act and move unilaterally to end the CWB.
But with the failure to develop a plan for a viable CWB, the task force has clarified the question being voted on -- a vote for marketing choice for wheat and barley will be a decision to end the CWB.
It is time for choice proponents to be forthright and cease using "marketing choice" and "viable CWB" in the same sentence.
A paper further detailing the arguments presented above will be released on November 14 and will be available at www.kis.usask.ca.
Murray Fulton and Richard Gray are
professors of agricultural economics at the University of Saskatchewan.
Sun Nov 12 2006
Murray Fulton
THE federal government has recently released its task force report on how the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) could be restructured to provide freedom of marketing choice for farmers while, in Agriculture Minister Chuck Strahl's words, "ensuring a strong, viable, voluntary CWB."
Though the task force report insists a new CWB "needs to have a high probability of success," the proposed changes to the CWB would not allow it to survive commercially.
The report calls for the elimination of the current CWB and the creation of CWB II, which would be owned by farmers through a co-operative or corporate structure. It would compete with the other grain companies in an open market, and would be allowed to acquire assets.
But there is no business case for a viable CWB II. It would be unable to obtain the strategic assets necessary to compete.
To function effectively, CWB II would require a way of getting grain from farmers on the prairies to the customers it lines up. It would also require in-depth customer knowledge, a loyal producer base and unique products and services.
Despite the assertions made in the report, none of these assets would be available to CWB II. There are at least four reasons for this.
First, without grain-handling facilities, particularly port facilities, the CWB II would be completely reliant on the existing grain companies to handle its grain.
It would be unable to provide guarantees to customers since the existing companies would much rather handle the grain themselves than for CWB II. And purchasing key facilities from the existing companies is not going to happen, since these players have no interest in allowing a viable CWB II to enter the market.
Second, the report argues that the current CWB's customer knowledge is an asset that would be retained under CWB II.
This argument is faulty. Once it is clear that the CWB is being restructured, the existing grain companies will hire the key sales and logistics people away from the CWB in order to have the expertise they require to operate in the new market. Unless the sales staff is indentured to the CWB -- which, of course, it is not -- the CWB will not retain special advantages in this area.
Third, a large loyal producer base is not a given. The requirement to purchase shares means that a cost-free option to participate in a CWB-like structure would no longer exist. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool found out that changing structure and refocusing its business resulted in a sharp reduction in producer loyalty. A similar reaction can be expected to the change proposed for the CWB.
Fourth, the task force suggests CWB II can serve producers better than its competitors by offering pooled contracts and helping buyers with new products.
But if producers and customers want these services, surely the CWB II's competitors can use the same strategies. Moreover, pooling is virtually impossible to operate in an open market. This is why there are no pools in the grain sector in the U.S. and why we do not see pooled contracts in canola (some will argue that the Ontario Wheat Producers' Marketing Board operates wheat pools, but these pools account for less than five per cent of total grain sales).
Since CWB II will have no significant strategic assets, it will not be commercially viable. Given the expectation that it will not be viable, farmers will have no incentive to purchase shares in it and, as a consequence, CWB II is unlikely to even get established. Thus, the only marketing choice that a farmer will have is, "To which private multinational grain company should I sell?" The government's announcement that it will hold a plebiscite on barley marketing in 2007 is welcome news for those producers who feared the government would ignore the CWB Act and move unilaterally to end the CWB.
But with the failure to develop a plan for a viable CWB, the task force has clarified the question being voted on -- a vote for marketing choice for wheat and barley will be a decision to end the CWB.
It is time for choice proponents to be forthright and cease using "marketing choice" and "viable CWB" in the same sentence.
A paper further detailing the arguments presented above will be released on November 14 and will be available at www.kis.usask.ca.
Murray Fulton and Richard Gray are
professors of agricultural economics at the University of Saskatchewan.
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