Why is the price of oil so low?
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Nov 25, 2006 (The Business - McClatchy-Tribune Business News via COMTEX) -- If a week is a long time in Westminster politics, four months is close to eternity for the global economy. When the oil price broke through the $78 mark to celebrate Bastille Day on 14 July, analysts were pretty united in saying it had no other way to go but up. They were spectacularly wrong: this week, after losing 30 percent of its value, oil is trading at close to its 17-month low, barely reacting to Lebanon's new crisis. Those who assured us that its price was about to go through the roof are now unashamedly predicting further declines.
So why did so many highly-paid analysts and fund mangers misread the oil market so badly, squandering so much of their investors' money? Their forecasts seemed plausible in July: Israel had just sent troops into Lebanon to tackle Hezbollah, a confrontation app-eared to be looming with Iran over its nuclear programme and the outlook for other volatile oil producer countries -- Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq -- appeared grim.
It was not just the politics that were horrendous: producers and refineries on the American Gulf coast were bracing themselves for another devastating hurricane season; global economic growth remained buoyant, relentlessly demanding ever more oil; and BP was suffering from severe problems with its Alaskan pipeline.
All of the conditions for a simultaneous supply crunch and demand boom appeared to have been met; hedge funds piled into the market, anticipating the price would soon spike to $100 or higher.
It was not to be. A barrel of West Texas Intermediate closed at $58.02 on Tuesday, well below where some had feared (or hoped) it would be. North Sea Brent Crude was $59.60 a barrel in early trading on Wednesday.
The biggest change has been psychological: the markets, dazed by the mergers and acquisitions boom, record profits, huge bonuses and a global economic boom which shows no sign of ending, suddenly lost all interest in geopolitics, especially after it became clear that Israel's operations in Lebanon would not escalate.
Most traders and economists have decided that the best way to prepare for catastrophe in the Middle East is to stick their heads firmly in the sand and hope it will all go away. Seemingly conciliatory comments from despots, such as Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are welcomed as a good reason to sell oil; negative comments are ignored.
Following the Republican defeat in this month's US mid-term elections, there is a new consensus that talking with dictators will make them change their spots, even though all of the evidence (from dealing with Hitler in the 1930s onwards) suggests this to be nonsense.
In the real world, the catastrophe that would be a nuclear Iran is inching ever closer. With Israel understandably committed to preventing countries officially committed to its annihilation from getting the bomb, a catastrophic confrontation at some point appears increasingly hard to avoid, potentially jeopardizing traffic through the Straits of Hormuz, sending the price of oil soaring to new heights and inflicting massive pain on the world economy.
Parts of Iraq and maybe Afghanistan could once again serve as terror training grounds over the next few years, effectively putting much of the region -- and its oil wells -- on a collision course with the world.
Paradoxically, the bullish oil forecasts of a few months ago were structurally sound: they correctly implied that the price of oil ought to go up to price in a proper premium risk. But this missed the point of forecasting the behaviour of oil futures.
John Maynard Keynes' famous comparison of stock-picking with a beauty contest could just as well be applied to today's short-sighted oil market: "It is not a case of choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest", Keynes said. "We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees."
The complete disappearance of any meaningful geopolitical risk premium has knocked around $20 off the price of a barrel of oil. Only structural and speculative forces remain; and here too the picture looks very different. Supply is higher than expected and demand much weaker; refining capacity -- especially for diesel and plane fuel -- has increased; there were no major hurricanes in the Gulf this year; the weather has been warmer; and BP sorted out its problems faster than expected. Many of the hedge funds that pumped their billions into commodities have now moved on to equities, further depressing the price of crude.
Most striking has been the weak demand for oil, despite buoyant global economic growth estimated at 5 percent by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2006, despite the slowdown in America.
The International Energy Agency's October report suggests that demand in the rich countries of the OECD for crude oil is likely to decrease by 0.2 percent this year. Remarkably, this comes despite accelerating growth in those countries, from 2.5 percent last year to around 3 percent this year, partly thanks to stronger than expected growth in Europe.
If past relationships between economic growth and the world's thirst for oil were still valid, Morgan Stanley calculates that global demand should have increased by 2.2m bpd (barrels per day) this year, against an IEA forecast of just 0.9m bpd. Western economies and consumers are reacting to a price of oil now 190 percent in real terms above the 1986-1999 average.
"Substitution among sources of energy and conservation are rational economic reactions to higher relative prices", says Eric Chaney, chief economist for Europe at Morgan Stanley.
Total demand for oil in the third quarter was 83.9m bpd, up from 83.3m bpd a year ago. Total supply this quarter was 85.6m bpd, up significantly from 84.3m bpd in 2005 and 79.8m bpd in 2003. Spare capacity and reserves have therefore risen markedly.
Opec's contribution to supply is 34.7m bpd. Total demand next year is now expected to be 85.9m bpd, a forecast which is probably too high given the rich economies' newly-discovered restraint in oil consumption. But even if these forecasts for demand growth materialise, total non-Opec supply in 2007 is set to grow to 52.7m bpd from 50.9m bpd in the third quarter of this year, slightly loosening the world's dependence on the cartel.
Opec's decision last month to reduce output by 1.2m bpd from 1 November is not worth the paper it's written on. Tanker traffic from Opec ports suggests it has managed to cut just 300,000 barrels of this. Other data suggests production actually inc-reased in November, as greedy cartel members reneged on their commitment.
For the time being, the oil price looks likely to remain low; many even believe that supply, including that from Canada's oil sands, will remain plentiful for a long time. This may be true; but given that the market is adding absolutely no premium for risk into the price of oil -- an absurd assumption -- the first geopolitical disruption big enough even for complacent traders to notice will send the price back up through the stratosphere. That doesn't include Lebanon.
A focus on supply fundamentals is all well and good but won't help if Iranian or Iraqi oil fields suddenly go up in flames. Companies and consumers should enjoy cheap fuel while it lasts.
By Allister Heath And Richard Orange
To see more of The Business, or to subscribe to the newspaper, go to
http://www.thebusinessonline.com.
http://news.tradingcharts.com/futures/0/8/86134580.html?mpop
Nov 25, 2006 (The Business - McClatchy-Tribune Business News via COMTEX) -- If a week is a long time in Westminster politics, four months is close to eternity for the global economy. When the oil price broke through the $78 mark to celebrate Bastille Day on 14 July, analysts were pretty united in saying it had no other way to go but up. They were spectacularly wrong: this week, after losing 30 percent of its value, oil is trading at close to its 17-month low, barely reacting to Lebanon's new crisis. Those who assured us that its price was about to go through the roof are now unashamedly predicting further declines.
So why did so many highly-paid analysts and fund mangers misread the oil market so badly, squandering so much of their investors' money? Their forecasts seemed plausible in July: Israel had just sent troops into Lebanon to tackle Hezbollah, a confrontation app-eared to be looming with Iran over its nuclear programme and the outlook for other volatile oil producer countries -- Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq -- appeared grim.
It was not just the politics that were horrendous: producers and refineries on the American Gulf coast were bracing themselves for another devastating hurricane season; global economic growth remained buoyant, relentlessly demanding ever more oil; and BP was suffering from severe problems with its Alaskan pipeline.
All of the conditions for a simultaneous supply crunch and demand boom appeared to have been met; hedge funds piled into the market, anticipating the price would soon spike to $100 or higher.
It was not to be. A barrel of West Texas Intermediate closed at $58.02 on Tuesday, well below where some had feared (or hoped) it would be. North Sea Brent Crude was $59.60 a barrel in early trading on Wednesday.
The biggest change has been psychological: the markets, dazed by the mergers and acquisitions boom, record profits, huge bonuses and a global economic boom which shows no sign of ending, suddenly lost all interest in geopolitics, especially after it became clear that Israel's operations in Lebanon would not escalate.
Most traders and economists have decided that the best way to prepare for catastrophe in the Middle East is to stick their heads firmly in the sand and hope it will all go away. Seemingly conciliatory comments from despots, such as Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are welcomed as a good reason to sell oil; negative comments are ignored.
Following the Republican defeat in this month's US mid-term elections, there is a new consensus that talking with dictators will make them change their spots, even though all of the evidence (from dealing with Hitler in the 1930s onwards) suggests this to be nonsense.
In the real world, the catastrophe that would be a nuclear Iran is inching ever closer. With Israel understandably committed to preventing countries officially committed to its annihilation from getting the bomb, a catastrophic confrontation at some point appears increasingly hard to avoid, potentially jeopardizing traffic through the Straits of Hormuz, sending the price of oil soaring to new heights and inflicting massive pain on the world economy.
Parts of Iraq and maybe Afghanistan could once again serve as terror training grounds over the next few years, effectively putting much of the region -- and its oil wells -- on a collision course with the world.
Paradoxically, the bullish oil forecasts of a few months ago were structurally sound: they correctly implied that the price of oil ought to go up to price in a proper premium risk. But this missed the point of forecasting the behaviour of oil futures.
John Maynard Keynes' famous comparison of stock-picking with a beauty contest could just as well be applied to today's short-sighted oil market: "It is not a case of choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest", Keynes said. "We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees."
The complete disappearance of any meaningful geopolitical risk premium has knocked around $20 off the price of a barrel of oil. Only structural and speculative forces remain; and here too the picture looks very different. Supply is higher than expected and demand much weaker; refining capacity -- especially for diesel and plane fuel -- has increased; there were no major hurricanes in the Gulf this year; the weather has been warmer; and BP sorted out its problems faster than expected. Many of the hedge funds that pumped their billions into commodities have now moved on to equities, further depressing the price of crude.
Most striking has been the weak demand for oil, despite buoyant global economic growth estimated at 5 percent by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2006, despite the slowdown in America.
The International Energy Agency's October report suggests that demand in the rich countries of the OECD for crude oil is likely to decrease by 0.2 percent this year. Remarkably, this comes despite accelerating growth in those countries, from 2.5 percent last year to around 3 percent this year, partly thanks to stronger than expected growth in Europe.
If past relationships between economic growth and the world's thirst for oil were still valid, Morgan Stanley calculates that global demand should have increased by 2.2m bpd (barrels per day) this year, against an IEA forecast of just 0.9m bpd. Western economies and consumers are reacting to a price of oil now 190 percent in real terms above the 1986-1999 average.
"Substitution among sources of energy and conservation are rational economic reactions to higher relative prices", says Eric Chaney, chief economist for Europe at Morgan Stanley.
Total demand for oil in the third quarter was 83.9m bpd, up from 83.3m bpd a year ago. Total supply this quarter was 85.6m bpd, up significantly from 84.3m bpd in 2005 and 79.8m bpd in 2003. Spare capacity and reserves have therefore risen markedly.
Opec's contribution to supply is 34.7m bpd. Total demand next year is now expected to be 85.9m bpd, a forecast which is probably too high given the rich economies' newly-discovered restraint in oil consumption. But even if these forecasts for demand growth materialise, total non-Opec supply in 2007 is set to grow to 52.7m bpd from 50.9m bpd in the third quarter of this year, slightly loosening the world's dependence on the cartel.
Opec's decision last month to reduce output by 1.2m bpd from 1 November is not worth the paper it's written on. Tanker traffic from Opec ports suggests it has managed to cut just 300,000 barrels of this. Other data suggests production actually inc-reased in November, as greedy cartel members reneged on their commitment.
For the time being, the oil price looks likely to remain low; many even believe that supply, including that from Canada's oil sands, will remain plentiful for a long time. This may be true; but given that the market is adding absolutely no premium for risk into the price of oil -- an absurd assumption -- the first geopolitical disruption big enough even for complacent traders to notice will send the price back up through the stratosphere. That doesn't include Lebanon.
A focus on supply fundamentals is all well and good but won't help if Iranian or Iraqi oil fields suddenly go up in flames. Companies and consumers should enjoy cheap fuel while it lasts.
By Allister Heath And Richard Orange
To see more of The Business, or to subscribe to the newspaper, go to
http://www.thebusinessonline.com.
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