Idiots.

[chaffmeister]

cchurch:

You seem to think that the CWB "loses money because of this risky business" of "pricing options".

That was only $89.5 million. What about the $226 million the CWB lost in the pool accounts due to "discretionary commodity trading"?

So the CWB trades futures in the pool accounts. If you want to see the full impact, don't stop at just the $226 million. The pools also got hit with $13 million in interest costs due to margin requirements for commodity hedging activity (page 60).

Also - if anyone can figure out whether the CWB dabbles in "discretionary trading" in forex, please let me know. I haven't found it yet.

Seems trading grain in the pool accounts is "risky business" as well.

Perhaps you thought that pooling removed risk. Nope. You just don't see it.

You all deserve better.

[charliep]

Perhaps cchurch is not aware but the discretionary trading is a process sanctioned and supported by the CWB elected board of directors. Some would call this speculation - will let others comment. The board of directors analyzes this sanctioned descretionary trading results as a performance measure. In 2007/08, these trades cost farmers who delivered to the CWB pooling accounts $226 mln over total deliveries of 21 mln tonnes or $10/tonne. If you want to use the adjusted $169 mln, I would use the pooled volume (excluding PPO contracts) of 16.5 MMT or again a loss of $10/tonne. If you delivered 100 tonnes to the CWB pooling system, discretionary trading took $1,000 out of your pocket. If you delivered 1,000 tonnes, your cost was $10,000.

Read the annual. Attend your local district meeting. Ask questions.

[bgmb]

The point I would like to make is that the cwb, money wise is basically a non issue for most of us compared to the amount of money we lost by not selling more at high prices. We all had the chance to sell as much 10 wheat as we wanted to through the fpc hell they even offer an act of god clause.

[charliep]

Way off the idiot topic but have to admit really appreciating the extra reporting of financial information as a result of new rules in reporting derivatives in financial statements under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. You can now work back from the performance measure around derivative trading (page 45) and the statement of losses on PPO accounts (all in unaudited commentary area of the annual report) back into the audited statements: balance sheet page 74, income statement page 75 and the statement of cash flow (page 76). I can reproduce the derivative loss out of the audited financial statements in the new world. Look for the word derivative in the financial statements, blank in the 2007 column (didn't provide this information before) and read footnotes.

[furrowtickler]

Imagine that no rebutal from cchurch, or agstar for that matter.
Good points fellas.
Idiots in my mind are those who make claims then cower in a corner to hide.
Make a statement - back it up!!!!

[TOM4CWB]

Dear Charlie,
]
I am very doubtful that true disclosure occured in these statements because of the amount of 'basis' gains (up to $6/bu)that offset hedge losses. We simply have no reasonable way to know what happened at 423 Main.

[charliep]

tom4cwb

You are right that the accountants wouldn't have the skill set to evaluate the CWB hedging/risk managment programs and how money flowed. I only highlight there is a lot more information in the annual report as a result of new requirements around reporting derivatives. Still trying to understand the process but the one positive thing is the audited statements provide real evidence (in this cost to CWB stakeholders) versus the theoretical performance measures in the front of the annual statement.

I would find the study the CWB commissioned in the FALL of 2007, likely completed during the early WINTER and what the board of directors actually did in FEBRUARY, 2008. The timing would suggest being like realizing your house is on fire, commissioning a study to find out what you do about the fire and having an implementation plan when the fire was in full blaze (volatile markets of Feb./Mar. 2008). Maybe I am wrong.

[charliep]

I need to admit to a mistake. The CWB risk management report was done in the fall of 2009, not 2008. The report was meant to review the processes the CWB B of D had approved and the operations had implemented.

[charliep]

More coffee please. Completed fall of 2008

[chaffmeister]

charlie - put down the coffee.

You mean in the fall of 2008 and not 2007. (But I think we knew what you meant.)

[chaffmeister]

you beat me to it...

[haveapulse]

Actually cchurch is right we are idiots: if this was Cargill someone would be in with a magnifying glass, long before the annual report and the necessary staff adjustments made.

As I understand, Cargills risk management strategy is based on a minimal approach to speculaton and hedging; we buy, we sell, we make profit in between.

Where cchurch is right is that the BOD must be idiots not to hire one of Cargills best traders, or even for that matter one of Cargills worst traders, and let them pick and chose who at the board now has the discipine and work ethic and market knowledge to remain.


And we are idiots to put up with the current BOD if they do nothing.